Archive for the ‘War Stories’ Category

Resistance to Change (1)

Thursday, September 10th, 2009

The infamous “resistance” to any proposed change takes many forms.

There are legitimate concerns, there’s contrariness, there’s fear of change, there’s protectionism, there’s a confrontation with a history of failed or abandoned initiatives, and finally, refusal to execute the work involved in the implementation of change, which unfortunately amounts to plain laziness.

Arriving at a consensus within a group of people may well face every previously stated type of objection, making compliance and adoption of almost any novelty / improvement / project difficult or even impossible at the best of times, no matter the value of the proposed initiative or change.

Over the course of the next few days (we hope), the author will endeavor to write out a few thoughts on each of the above.

Contrariness
The contrarian takes two forms: he can be a naysayer to anything he does not himself initiate, and thus, becomes a negative influence and rarely a helping hand in any of the activities of the group, corporate or otherwise, or he can be a conscientious critic of unlikely, unpalatable, unreasonable, inefficient or ineffective practices, methods or proposed “advances”, seeking to ensure quality and thoughtful of achieving specific goals. Of course, whether or not the contrarian can deliver his message in palatable form remains a challenge, and the (often different or opposed) views tendered by said contrarian can clash with the majority or the view adopted by leadership. Both require considerable maturity to accept the opposing current and trigger intelligent discussions based on analyzing what that impopular person is saying to obtain the value or pointed correctives that his views may contain.

In the above, “unlikely, unpalatable, unreasonable, inefficient or ineffective practices, methods or proposed “advances”…” could merely signify that there may be room for better adjustments or they may be downright necessary: the person deemed a contrarian may merely seek a slightly better approach, or more bang for the (same) buck…

As examples… 
One anecdote I often use (and may even be found in another posting on this site) is the advent of the first Windows-based or Windows-compatible (the Microsoft registered brand used without permission, not the household-type) vibration condition-monitoring software. Given the current preponderance of that operational system or platform, the reader will understand a few years have gone by since the anecdotal incident.

That software’s main qualities were:
1) it was going to be first to market under the increasingly dominant Windows (see previous disclaimer),
2) it actually worked without crashing,
3) it simplified report printing and layouts, but only for what was now extremely basic (or entry-level) reporting.

The same software principal defects were:
1) It offered little except basic functions, made readily accessible not through any ingenious design, but merely through the Graphic-User Interface’s benefits,
2) the software did away with many of the useful application functions that were readily available under DOS (but of course, that was going to be rectified in the future, meaning probably never),
3) it cost a frightening amount of money

My attempts at making suggestions to achieve expansion from the foundation we previously had, as opposed to devolution in terms of application, were met with allusions to “resistance to change”, when in fact, the nature of my objections was “Nice eye-candy, where’s the meat?” or where was the substance to assist analysts in better doing their jobs.

Another valid example, when faced with various problems during a reliability audit done under another company’s auditing process (or lack thereof), was to ask whether the process had been the subject of an FMEA (Failure Modes & Effects Analysis). After all, if you sell the science, the execution and the mindset, you should be interested in applying all of the previous to your own product, whether physical or service oriented.

In the previous statement, my “or lack thereof” was unfair, and of the naysayer contrariness type: in all fairness, they did have a process, but the process should have been accompanied by clear directives and guidelines as to “do’s and dont’s”. The process should have benefitted from strong warnings against allowing corporate tag-alongs during execution. My suggestion that an FMEA would clearly have established problems with such a practice came from obvious hurdles such as the reluctance of audit interview participants to formulate their answers in the presence of a corporate representative.

Opposing views leads to (minor) confrontation, and people are increasingly uncomfortable with disagreement or argumentation. Yet, out of the clashes of ideas are born the better or even best solutions. HBR (Harvard Business Review) and other management article sources state that the increasing disappearance of differing opinion hurts business.

For the well-meaning contrarian, perhaps the road to Hell is paved with good intentions.

© 2009 by François Gagnon

Reliability Challenges & Fundamentals

Sunday, March 16th, 2008

Numerous experts report the undeniable absolute necessity of management conviction and dedication for reliability efforts to result in a proper and sustained “field” (that would be the plant floor) implementation. No argument could possibly otherwise convince us or our readers. We agree on something.

Why then do we see a generalized backtracking to antiquated methods or unwitting feeble returns from reliability approaches? Where is this management commitment when reports from the field indicate reliable methods get implemented and then seem to vanish into thin air or quickly get set aside? Why is apparent regression almost inevitable?

What some may fail to mention is the capital importance of fundamentals. And these essentials may escape most of the “business model improvement” proponents due to a simple and quite ugly fact: the “business” people rarely speak with the technical personnel who get the maintenance train on track and keep it there. And when they do, as they are often used to speaking very different languages, these parties may have limited exchanges or communications due to the different focus or interests they manifest.

The communication gap may be further aggravated by a largely false perception in head offices that the technical people remain uneducated. Nowadays, their credentials and pertinent experience may even at times exceed those of decision makers. This is not to criticize anyone: the preceding merely attempts to state occasionally occurring (and previously encountered) circumstances.

The predictive maintenance and condition-based approach to maintenance and reliability are vital to success. Yet, these facets of maintenance and engineering have been in place for some time, with often poor to moderate results (the author is being kind; so many PdM or CBM programs are hobbled structurally and technically that their returns can only be qualified as hobbled). The promise of fabulous returns can not be met when the program is not “fed” properly: investment, education (training at ALL levels) and sensible recognition of efforts, to name but a few factors too often missing from the final recipe…

What makes you think that doing the same thing in the same way will now yield a better result? What will now be done to properly adjust the targeting? The liabilities (or problems) and personnel are the same. Or personnel keeps changing in turnstile-mode.

Of course, critics might glumly reply “Have you not been part of the system that created the ineffectiveness we must now endure?”, a pertinent albeit biased question. We propose a viable working platform or product to our clients. We might express it as “we sell a car”. The client then plays pick and choose, dismantling the platform to purchase (allegorically) the two left-side wheels, one rear bumper, and parts of the engine, instead of buying the whole functional vehicle. The reasons are many and they feel justified in this purchasing approach: they already have two right-side wheels (of a different size), one bumper and engine parts (likely mixing centimeters and inches), so they feel they can reassemble a working whole. The truth seems to point to “wishful thinking”.

An example? Some years back as I instructed a Vibration Analysis 1 course for one of the main vendors in our field of endeavor, two technicians showed up from an automotive parts manufacturing plant. They expressed their concerns relative to the course, having discussed with their supervisor what they felt was their need for training (they would have been more comfortable with an introductory course instead of the one they were now to attend). I assured them of my availability over lunch and after regular hours should they face serious hurdles, and also told them I ran a very open classroom where questions were welcome at any time. This can be helpful, but if fear of ridicule and timidity become the governing concern of the puzzled, our best efforts to remain available yield little in the way of improved comprehension. At any rate, they never availed themselves of the repeatedly tendered “extra” support or semi-private sessions.

Most Level 1 courses clearly state a need for 6 months prior experience and/or having attended an introductory class. These two participants were lacking in both respects. Net result: come evaluation time, these two felt that the vendor offering this training was only interested in revenue and they never should have been “allowed” to attend that course.

Everybody is entitled to an opinion. Ours would differ slightly: in the hopes of saving some training dollars, their supervisor sent these participants to a course that was above their current reach. In so doing, he wasted more training dollars than he saved. He also exposed his technicians to a little discouragement, and lower motivation due to perceived difficulties.

Could the problem have been resolved right then and there by using a different approach? Course contents did not lend itself to a quick readjustment: other participants quite liked that course and got what they came for, but then, they had the necessary bases to absorb the curriculum.

To the previous example, we should also add the unpopularity of introductory courses in certain areas of the world. The “client” (purchasing or management) feel them to be a reach for more $$$, when in fact, the participant get swamped with too much material when attending the “chosen” (not by them) higher-level course.

Worse yet, in those same areas, when a certification exam is faced at the end of a week’s training, some participants have at times been warned that failure would equate dismissal. Sitting (or writing) an exam that is meant to cull the untrained may dauntingly challenge the neophyte.

Another sad hurdle to reliability excellence remains the discrepancy in pay rate and benefits afforded those who practice it adequately. Sooner or later, if competent technical personnel find they may be given better opportunities elsewhere, they will jump ship and seek out better climes. There are management or HR theories about pay scales and bonuses (this writer will purposely stay away from them as readers might be offended by psychological aspects of remuneration), but an occasional carrot, such as two checks waiting in the wings (gold and silver medals, if you wish) might yield surprising competitive benefits. Or setting PdM program goals and tying a bonus to meeting those targets.

Proactive engineering steps used hand in hand with precision maintenance yield better reliability. The latter is undeniable. Yet, without a strong predictive program, above and beyond any scheduled preventive replacements (likely arising from an RCM study) and inspections, production and asset reliability will remain out of reach.

PdM / CBM or Condition-Monitoring ARE the technical foundation that can be encouraged, but not managed at any level other than that of maintenance and engineering. In other words, if reliability is a fortification against trouble and decay and a guarantee of productivity, the walls or battlements depend on solid groundwork called predictive maintenance.

Simply put, Asset Reliability (and maintenance) can not be driven by failure-detection if predictive efforts remain incapable of perceiving faults.

© 2008 by François Gagnon

Bemoaning Analytical Costs

Thursday, March 22nd, 2007

We sat in with a (then) prospective customer having problems with a very special machine: one of a kind, a prototype really, made in Europe, highly-complex variable speed multistage planetary gearbox, with inverted simultaneous movements: a fun challenge for an analyst, but one that could rapidly turn to nightmare if sound methods were not followed in orderly or procedural fashion.

While we took a look at drawings, and commented, the meeting went on with the people in charge. “We’re losing $100,000 a day on reduced production!” Indeed, the vibration would get so bad as to limit speed, \commensurately reducing output.

Now for vibration analysis purposes, we need to do a speed-sweep recording of multiple channels of information to then compare reactions, and perhaps even build an animation. The problem obviously needs to be quantified before we can affirm anything, and the measurements taken by the customer proved fairly basic: lending a nebulous idea, but no great help in establishing the scope or nature of the problem.

We conferred, and stated a package price of $20,000 all-inclusive: measurements, analysis, report in both brief and full versions, presentation of report, engineered solution.

That’s when the roof caved in on us with the plant manager almost calling us names (along the lines of price gouger, and a few other terms punctuated with choice epithets). Pause… Shall we say it was clear the price was not to their liking? Yet, in the meantime, over a 90 minute meeting, they had allegedly lost $6,000.

Was the proposed price justified? Absolutely! We had a 12 hours 16-channel collection speed-sweep and variable-load sequence, data review (Simultaneous data from sixteen channels under controlled variation of recorded factors conditions requires ample time) and analysis, a possible (and rather likely) machine design review, a whole day of presentation possibly involving two persons. As a matter of fact, we were trying to deliver a fully-packaged, functional and feasible solution to an unknown problem at a reasonable price.

To the uninitiated, multi-channel work may seem a mere matter of unconnected information, but correlations need to be established: imagine recording 16 TV channels and then finding out if commercials are synchronized (or not), if there is an underlying contents programming emulation where all networks decide to show similar programs at the same time. Then, imagine that your need to cut up one channel’s contents in tiny pieces, or process it differently to isolate “dialogue”, or modify the contents of one channel in relation to another’s.

Within the context of this contract, synchronous time-averaging and order-tracking had to be completed in post-processing, high-resolution FFT cascades had to be extracted, and in this case, high-resolution means much more than 3200 or 12800 lines. Jitter and jerk even were assessed. A little structural work was done to complete the picture. Our Finite Element specialist associate also handled the case.

All this takes time. And the relationships and workings are not automated. A guiding intelligence must determine how best to extract what seems relevant to the mission.

Once the initial storm blew over, and the solutions implemented, all parties were content, but THAT is another story!

Additionally, one may read herein the key point of the nuance between detection and analysis: “detection” was here summarily conducted by intolerable vibration levels making the machine dysfunctional at its design speed, a status that was readily assessed using portable instruments, whereas analysis called for much more depth.

© 2007 by François Gagnon